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Abstract 
The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement) permits the imposition of anti-dumping duties for as 
long and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which 
is causing injury, subject to the proviso that they must be 
terminated after five years unless a sunset review has been 
initiated. A sunset review has the purpose of either permitting or 
terminating the continuation of an anti-dumping duty. This is 
significant because if the sunset review is not initiated prior to 
the expiry of the five-year period, the anti-dumping duties will be 
terminated. 
Therefore, this places an emphasis on the determination of the 
precise date of commencement of the anti-dumping duties. This 
is because an incorrect determination of the date of the 
imposition of the anti-dumping duty has obvious financial 
implications for the interested parties. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in South Africa has delivered two salient judgments in 
this regard: firstly, in Progress Office Machines CC v SARS 
2008 2 SA 13 (SCA) (POM), and then more recently, in 
Association of Meat Importers v ITAC 2013 4 All SA 253 (SCA) 
(AMIE).  
This paper contends that these two judgments are in conflict 
and are riddled with inconsistencies. Secondly, the paper 
contends that the SCA has in the recent AMIE case virtually 
rewritten its earlier judgment of Progress Office Machines. 
Lastly, the paper shows that the approach of South African 
courts to whether the Anti-Dumping Agreement is binding on 
South African law is fraught with uncertainty and ambivalence. 
The case analysis also reflects on the impact of the newly 
minted but yet to be implemented Customs Duty Act with a view 
to assessing the impact of the new legislation on the issues 
currently plaguing the anti-dumping regime of South Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (GATT) works in 
tandem with the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (Anti-Dumping Agreement 
or ADA), to regulate the practice of "dumping". "Dumping" is defined as the 
introduction of a product into the commerce of another country at below 
the normal prices.1 The GATT permits the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties on the "dumped" products.2 The anti-dumping duty is calculated 
based on the "margin of dumping": that is, the difference between the price 
of the "dumped" product and the "normal price" of the product.3 
South Africa is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Its 
international obligations on tariffs and trade arise from the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.4 South Africa has promulgated the Customs and Excise Act 
(the CEA),5 the International Trade Administration Act (the ITAA)6 and the 
International Trade Administration Commission Regulations on Anti-
Dumping in South Africa (hereafter, the Regulations),7 which are all read 
together to give effect to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.8 However, South 
Africa is in the process of rewriting its customs legislation to bring it into 
line with international standards.  
                                            
*  Clive Vinti. LLB (cum laude) (University of Fort Hare); LLM (University of Cape 
Town). Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of the Free State. E-mail: 
vintic@ufs.ac.za. This paper was originally presented at the North West University 
Conference on Critical Law and Governance Perspectives on Food Security in South 
Africa: Exploring the Role of Policy-Makers and Other Stakeholders, in July 2015. 
1  Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) (hereafter GATT). 
Furthermore, A VI of the GATT read with Aa 2 and 3 of the Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) 
(Anti-Dumping Agreement) (hereafter ADA) provides that the aggrieved party must 
prove the following: Firstly, the importing country must prove that the product is 
being sold at a price lower than the normal value; secondly, the dumped product 
must be a like "product"; thirdly, there must be a threat to or a material injury to or 
the retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry; and lastly, there must be 
a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury.  
2  Article VI of the GATT. 
3  Regulation 12(1) in GN 3197 in GG 25684 of 14 November 2003. See also A 2.2 of 
the ADA. 
4  International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 
4 SA 618 (CC) (hereafter SCAW). 
5  Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (hereafter CEA). 
6  International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (hereafter ITAA). 
7  GN 3197 in GG 25684 of 14 November 2003 (International Trade Administration 
Commission Regulations on Anti-Dumping in South Africa) (hereafter the 
Regulations). 
8  SCAW para 2. The court also holds in para 25 that Parliament ratified South Africa's 
membership of the WTO on 2 December 1994 and approved the ADA on 6 April 
1995. 
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Consequently, the CEA will be replaced by the Customs Duty Act9 
(hereafter the CDA). The CDA will become the primary statute regulating 
dumping in South Africa on a date yet to be determined by the President.10 
Because of delays in the commencement and implementation of the CDA, 
this paper will proceed on the premise that the CEA is still the primary 
legislation regulating dumping in South Africa and the analysis of the case 
law below will be based on this premise. 
Essentially, the ADA provides that the anti-dumping duties must terminate 
after five years unless a sunset review occurs that permits the continuation 
of the duty until the review is finalised: at which point the duty will either be 
terminated or will continue.11 As submitted earlier, in order to honour its 
obligations under the ADA, South Africa promulgated the Regulations. 
These Regulations were meant to mimic the ADA.12In line with the ADA, 
Regulation 38.1 provides that definitive anti-dumping duties will remain in 
place for a period of five years from the date of the publication of the 
Commission's final recommendation unless otherwise specified or unless 
reviewed prior to the lapse of the five-year period. Building on this, 
Regulation 53.1 provides that anti-dumping duties shall remain in place for 
a period not exceeding five years from the imposition or the last review 
thereof. Thus, Regulation 38 functions to introduce a default period of five 
years at the start of the anti-dumping duty whereas Regulation 53 
terminates an anti-dumping duty that purports to endure beyond that 
period.13  
However, the CEA also creates a necessary yet amorphous wrinkle 
through the instrument of "provisional payments".14 Provisional payments 
are imposed during the period when the International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) is investigating the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties.15 ITAC is the official institution mandated with investigating the 
practice of dumping in South Africa.16 The provisional payment is regarded 
as "security" on goods subject to it and may be retrospectively imposed.17 
In the same vein, the ADA provides for the imposition of "provisional 
measures", which may take the form of provisional duties or security after 
                                            
9  Customs Duty Act 30 of 2014 (hereafter CDA). 
10  SARS 2015 http://www.sars.gov.za. 
11  Article 11.3 of the ADA. 
12  Progress Office Machines v SARS 2008 2 SA 13 (SCA) para 7. 
13  Association of Meat Importers v ITAC 2013 4 All SA 253 (SCA) para 75. 
14  Section 57A of the CEA. 
15  Section 57A of the CEA. 
16  Section 16 of the ITAA. 
17  Section 57A of the CEA. 
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a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of the dumping and 
the consequent injury to a domestic industry.18 This issue could trigger 
legal disputes for the interested persons because the specific date on 
which the duties are imposed must be calculated accurately, lest the 
duties endure beyond what is legally justifiable. This is particularly 
significant because the courts in South Africa lean towards disregarding 
the date from which the provisional payments are imposed in the 
determination of the overall period of operation of the anti-dumping duties.  
To this end, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has delivered two 
significant judgments: firstly in Progress Office Machines v the South 
African Revenue Service19 (POM hereafter) and then more recently, in 
Association of Meat Importers v ITAC (AMIE hereafter).20 These two cases 
hinge on the interpretation of the date of the "imposition" of definitive anti-
dumping duties, particularly where provisional measures are involved, 
which invariably determine the date of expiry of the duties as espoused by 
Regulations 38 and 53 of the Regulations.  
Consequently, this paper elucidates the method of determining the date of 
the commencement of anti-dumping duties through a detailed analysis of 
the AMIE and POM cases, together with the relevant legislation. This 
paper contends that these two judgments are in conflict and are riddled 
with inconsistencies. Secondly, the paper contends that the SCA has in 
the recent AMIE case virtually rewritten its earlier judgment of Progress 
Office Machines. Lastly, the paper reflects on the South African courts' 
approach to the ADA, and it is found that the approach is fraught with 
uncertainty and ambivalence. In a bid to offer a holistic view, the paper 
also reflects on the impact of the CDA with a view to assessing the impact 
of the new legislation on the issues currently plaguing the anti-dumping 
regime of South Africa.  
2 Factual background 
In South African law, if there is evidence that dumping is occurring, ITAC 
will recommend to the Minister of Trade and Industry to impose the duty.21 
If the Minister of Trade and Industry accepts the report and 
recommendations of the ITAC, he can request the Minister of Finance to 
                                            
18  Articles 7.2 and 5 of the ADA.  
19  Progress Office Machines v SARS 2008 2 SA 13 (SCA). 
20  Association of Meat Importers v ITAC 2013 4 All SA 253 (SCA). 
21  Section 16 of the ITAA. 
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amend Schedule 2 appropriately, which the Minister of Finance is 
permitted to do by notice in the Government Gazette.22 
In AMIE, three anti-dumping duties had been imposed by the amendment 
of Schedule 2 before the ITAC came into effect.23 For the sake of 
convenience this paper will focus on the anti-dumping duty imposed on 
chicken meat portions from the United States of America.24 An 
investigation on anti-dumping against US poultry had been initiated and 
provisional payment was imposed on 5 July 2000.25 The anti-dumping duty 
was introduced into Schedule 2 with effect from that date by notice in the 
Government Gazette on 27 December 2000.26 It is immediately apparent 
that the date of the imposition of the provisional payment and that of the 
definitive anti-dumping duty differ. 
The duty in Progress Office Machines was imposed on paper products 
imported from Indonesia, by notice in the Government Gazette on 28 May 
1999, with retrospective effect to 27 November 1998.27 The approach of 
the authorities here differs from that in AMIE because the authorities in the 
POM case had made a deliberate effort to ensure that the date of 
imposition of the provisional payment correlated with the date of imposition 
of the definitive anti-dumping duty.  
3 A critique of the SCA's approach on anti-dumping 
disputes  
3.1 The "date of publication" theory 
The central legal issue in both AMIE and POM is the method of 
determining the date when the definitive anti-dumping duties commence 
and the date when they terminate, particularly where provisional payments 
are involved. It was contended in AMIE by the authorities that if duties 
have been terminated, which was interpreted to mean the duties ceased to 
exist,28 they terminated via Article 11.3 of the ADA directly or indirectly or 
by operation of law.29 The court in AMIE held that the mere existence of 
the duties on the Schedule served as a record of the existence of the 
                                            
22  AMIE para 6. 
23  AMIE para 20. 
24  AMIE para 21 
25  AMIE para 21. 
26  AMIE para 21.  
27  POM para 8. 
28  AMIE para 42. 
29  AMIE para 41. 
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duties.30 Thus the duties were held to have been brought into existence by 
an act of the Minister of Finance in publishing the amendment to the 
Schedule.31 This espouses the "date of publication" theory.  
However, in POM, the date of publication theory had been rejected. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the date of the imposition of the anti-
dumping duty was 27 November 1998, as the "burden" of the duty took 
effect on that day.32 This date correlates with the date upon which the 
provisional payments were imposed. Therefore, this denotes that the 
provisional payments and definitive anti-dumping duties are the same 
species. Secondly, POM holds that based on section 57A (3) of the Act, 
the duty was fully effective on 27 November 1998.33 In fact, in AMIE it was 
held that the Minister when amending Schedule 2 is entitled to antedate 
the duty to the date on which the provisional payment was imposed.34 
Thus there is clear legal provision to antedate the date of the imposition of 
a definitive anti-dumping duty to correlate with the date of the imposition of 
the provisional payment, presumably to avoid the unfair consequences of 
having duties that endure beyond what is legally justifiable.  
The implication of POM is that the purpose of amending Schedule 2 by the 
Minister of Finance was merely to record the duty which would have 
already commenced from the date on which the provisional payment was 
imposed. That is to say, the duty commences on the retrospective date. 
This would then mean that the sunset review which was conducted after 
the 5 year period had lapsed in both AMIE and POM was an exercise in 
futility. On this rationale, the publication of the duties is not crucial to the 
commencement of the anti-dumping duties. This approach accords with 
logic and the Anti-Dumping Regulations as constituted at the time.  
This is perhaps the reason why there was a proposal to amend the 
Regulations in South Africa to reflect the date of publication theory as 
postulated in AMIE.35 The court in AMIE proffers the same suggestion.36 
Despite the proposed amendments to the Regulations, which were meant 
                                            
30  AMIE para 44. 
31  AMIE para 44. 
32  POM para 16. 
33  POM para 17. Also see POM para 19, in which Malan AJA holds that there is no 
suggestion that the anti-dumping duty in force for the retrospective period from 27 
November 1998 to 28 May 1999 was anything other than a definitive anti-dumping 
duty. 
34  See AMIE para 7. Also see s 57A of the CEA. 
35  Regulation 54(1) in GN 1606 in GG 29382 of 10 November 2006.  
36  AMIE para 82. 
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to create clarity on dumping,37 South African courts do not seem to 
understand the issue of dumping with sufficient certainty, nor can they 
interpret the Regulations correctly.38  
Ironically, the SCA in AMIE held that its interpretation of the Regulations 
does not mean that South Africa is in breach of its obligations under Article 
11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.39 In order to justify their rationale, 
the court in AMIE attempts unsuccessfully to restrict the ambit of Progress 
Office Machines to the application of Article 11.3 domestically.40 This 
implies that the AMIE decision is wrong in law according to the 
Regulations pertaining at the time. In fact, one can go so far as to say that 
the proposed amendment of the Regulations is a way through which the 
executive could validate the SCA decision by legitimising duties which in 
law had expired. 
In addition, the court in AMIE ambiguously endorses the decision in POM 
on the duration of duties.41 This creates uncertainty as to what the legal 
position is on the actual duration of duties. Brink contends that in practice, 
in South Africa, when anti-dumping duties are imposed with retrospective 
effect, the total duration of the duties exceeds five years.42  
Clarity may come from the recently passed, albeit yet to be implemented, 
Customs Duty Act. The CDA, though silent on the actual duration of an 
anti-dumping duty, provides that a provisional anti-dumping duty is 
imposed by notice in the Gazette and takes effect on a date specified in 
the notice, which may be a date before, on or after the date of publication 
of that notice.43 This spells an end to the contentious date of publication 
theory and uses a common sense approach that provides the regulatory 
authorities with the flexibility to choose an appropriate date. The common 
sense approach of section 15 of the CDA is commendable and negates 
the type of disputes discussed in this paper as the authorities will be able 
to choose an appropriate date that allows for the duties to lapse when the 
5-year period mandated by the Regulations and the ADA lapses, unless 
re-authorised by a sunset review. This would bring the South African 
dumping regulatory framework into line with international law and practice. 
Thus Section 15 enables the alignment of Regulations 38.1 and 51.1, as 
                                            
37  Brink 2006 http://tinyurl.com/j6472zr. 
38  Brink 2012 http://tinyurl.com/zk633kd. 
39  AMIE para 82. 
40  AMIE para 82. 
41  AMIE para 82. 
42  Brink 2008 De Jure 643-648. 
43  Sections 15(1) and (3) of the CDA. 
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done by the authorities in POM, in order to avoid the problems 
experienced in AMIE.  
Furthermore, section 15(3) of the CDA is significant in two respects: firstly, 
it is a departure from the CEA in that it explicitly requires the publication of 
the said notice. Secondly, the CDA reiterates the CEA in that it also 
provides for the ante-dating of the provisional anti-dumping duty and 
requires that such a date be specifically provided for in the said notice in 
the Gazette.  
3.2 The date of the "imposition" of provisional payments 
A "provisional payment" is "security for any anti-dumping duty which may 
be retrospectively imposed" and may be set off against the amount of any 
retrospective anti-dumping duty payable.44 In AMIE the provisional 
payment was imposed on 5 July 2000,45 whereas in Progress Office 
Machines it was common cause that the Minister of Finance had imposed 
the definitive anti-dumping duty on 28 May 1999 with retrospective effect 
to 27 November 1998.46 This denotes that in Progress Office Machines the 
Minister aligned the date of the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping 
duty with that of the provisional payment, which had been imposed with 
effect from 27 November 1998.47 The effect of this determination is that 
the duties would terminate five years from 27 November 1998 unless a 
sunset review was initiated prior to the expiry of the five-year period. 
Consequently, the court ruled that the duties in question had lapsed, 
because the sunset review had occurred more than five years after the 
anti-duties were imposed.  
Secondly; Progress Office Machines' approach implies that the provisional 
payment represents an anti-dumping duty in the interim, pending a final 
determination by the investigating authority. This view accords with the 
ADA, which provides that provisional measures may take the form of a 
"duty or security by cash or deposit".48 This approach is emphatically 
endorsed by the Panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High 
Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States (Mexico Corn Syrup 
hereafter), which expressly equates "provisional anti-dumping duties" to 
"provisional measures" under circumstances rather similar to those of the 
                                            
44  Sections 55-57A(3) of the CEA. In this regard also see POM para 4. Also see Reg 
33 of the Regulations. In this regard also see A 9.3.2 of ADA. 
45  AMIE para 21. 
46  POM para 4. 
47  POM para 4. 
48  Article 7.2 of the ADA. 
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cases in question.49 Even more significantly, Mexico Corn Syrup 
establishes that the period of time for which a provisional payment is 
imposed is generally determinative of the period during which a definitive 
anti-dumping duty is levied retroactively.50 This approach endorses the 
decision and methodology employed in POM. 
Furthermore, in POM it was established that it is only where a provisional 
payment has been imposed that the Minister of Finance may impose a 
definitive anti-dumping duty retrospectively.51 It was common cause that 
the Minister of Finance had imposed the definitive anti-dumping duty on 28 
May 1999 "with retrospective effect to 27 November 1998".52 Significantly, 
the Panel in Mexico Corn Syrup held that provisional measures constitute 
the basis under which a Member may impose definitive anti-dumping 
duties retroactively.53  
Thirdly; the set-off provision in the CEA establishes a clear and direct 
relationship between provisional payments and definitive anti-dumping 
duties.54 It can conceivably be argued that the provisional payment is the 
equivalent of an anti-dumping duty as espoused by the ADA in Article 
10.3. This approach is also endorsed by the Panel Report in Mexico Corn 
Syrup, which holds that a claim regarding the duration of the provisional 
measures relates to the definitive anti-dumping duty.55  
In tandem with Mexico Corn Syrup, section 55(2) (b) of the CEA permits 
the imposition an anti-dumping duty with effect from the date on which any 
provisional payment is imposed under section 57A.56 The effect of this 
section and its corollary, Article 7.2 of the ADA, is that the date of 
commencement of the anti-dumping duty is in fact the date on which the 
provisional payment is imposed.  
However, the court in AMIE held that the term "provisional measures" is 
superfluous in the regulations, as the provisional measures that have been 
chosen are not a "provisional duty" but instead "security" for an ante-dated 
duty.57 Ndlovu agrees with the rationale of AMIE and expresses the 
opinion that despite the fact that it may sound unfair, the five-year period 
                                            
49  WTO 2001 http://tinyurl.com/gwkfrmf (hereafter Mexico Corn Syrup) para 7.3. 
50  Mexico Corn Syrup para 7.53. 
51  POM para 4. 
52  POM para 4. 
53  Mexico Corn Syrup para 7.53. 
54  Section 57A(5) of the CEA. See also A 9.3.2 of the ADA. 
55  Mexico Corn Syrup para 7.53. 
56  POM para 4. 
57  AMIE para 66. 
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of the duty excludes the period during which provisional duties are 
imposed.58 This approach is problematic: firstly, the word "definitive" 
implies that there is a situation prior to the present when the duties are 
"provisional", and secondly, Article 7.2 of the ADA explicitly provides that 
provisional measures may take the form of "provisional duties" or 
"security". It follows therefore that the court's differentiation between 
"provisional measures" and "security" is superficial as it contradicts the 
reasonable interpretation proffered by international law as per section 233 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution). The same court did acknowledge that the Regulations are 
borrowed from the ADA. It follows then that the arbitrary retort that the 
provisional duty date of imposition is immaterial to the calculation of the 
date of commencement of anti-dumping duties is unsound. 
Contrary to POM, the same court held in AMIE that the word "imposition" 
viewed in isolation is quite capable of meaning the date upon which 
liability for the payment of duties came into being, which is taken to be 
when the ante-dated liability arose by amendment to Schedule 2,59 
contrary to what was found to be the case in POM, which had held that the 
date of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty was 27 November 1998, as 
the "burden" of the duty took effect on that day.60 The decision in POM is 
correct because the word "liability" implies a financial obligation to pay, 
and this is logically triggered by the imposition of provisional payments. It 
would lead to inequitable results if the "liability" were deemed to be 
incurred only upon the date of the amendment of Schedule 2 as per the 
rationale of AMIE.  
The rationale of the court in AMIE is that words must be construed in their 
context and in the language of the Regulations: thus if meaning of 
"imposition" is clear as provided in the Regulations, then that is the 
meaning it must be given even if it conflicts with what is provided to be the 
meaning of the word in Article 11.3 of the ADA.61 This is astounding, 
because the same court had conceded on numerous occasions, in the 
same judgment, that it is careful not to be in conflict with the ADA.62 
The court in AMIE held further that the default period in Regulation 38.1 
commences on the date of publication of ITAC's final recommendation, 
                                            
58  Ndlovu 2013 SAPL 279-307. 
59  AMIE para 68. 
60  POM para 16. 
61  AMIE para 68. 
62  AMIE para 62. In this regard see also AMIE paras 64 and 77. 
C VINTI  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  11 
despite the fact that neither the Regulations nor the CEA require 
publication.63 This is taken to have been implied by the Regulations 38.1 
and would also be consistent with the ADA.64 Publication is said to occur 
when the Minister Finance or Minister of Trade and Industry introduces or 
continues an anti-dumping duty by their respective notices in the Gazette. 
If that is so, the periods in Regulations 38 and 53 would coincide.65  
Further to this, if Regulation 38.1 required independent publication by 
ITAC, that would always occur before the respective notices of the 
Ministers were published and the effect of that would be that the default 
period of Regulation 38.1 would expire before the guillotine came down in 
Regulation 53.1.66 To take it a step further, it is held in AMIE that if the 
date of "imposition" for the purposes of Regulation 53.1 is the ante-date 
from which there is a liability, the regulation would be blatantly inconsistent 
with Regulation 38.1, as the default period in Regulation 38.1 would 
always exceed the maximum period of its existence under Regulation 
53.1.The SCA then held in AMIE that the only sensible construction that 
brings about consistency is if the term "imposition" in Regulation 53 means 
the date upon which Schedule 2 is amended by notice in the Gazette.67 
The court in AMIE also held that that determination would not mean that 
South Africa would be in breach of its obligations under Article 11.3 of the 
WTO Agreement.68 This is perplexing because in the same judgment the 
court held that Article 11.3 does not apply to South Africa.69 It is this 
ambivalent approach to the ADA that undermines the credibility of both 
judgments.  
The CDA delivers the much-need respite in the debate by introducing 
simpler terminology and clarifying the method of determining the date of 
commencement of anti-dumping duties as well as explicitly confirming the 
nexus between "provisional measures" and the "definitive anti-dumping 
duties". According to the CDA, the Commissioner can impose a 
"provisional anti-dumping duty" by notice in the Gazette.70 Thus, the CDA 
replaces the ambiguous instrument of "provisional measures" provided for 
by the CEA, with that of "provisional anti-dumping duties".  
                                            
63  AMIE para 77. 
64  AMIE para 77. 
65  AMIE para 77. 
66  AMIE para 79. 
67  AMIE para 81. 
68  AMIE para 82. 
69  AMIE para 58. 
70  Section 15 of the CDA. 
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Fundamentally, section 15(1) of the CDA also makes it clear that the 
provisional anti-dumping duty must be imposed for such a period as the 
Commission may require. Building on that, section 15(5) of the CDA offers 
the most illuminating solution to the determination of the question of 
whether or not the period during which the provisional duty is imposed 
must be taken into consideration when calculating the total period for the 
duration of the definitive anti-dumping duty: according to section 15(5),a 
provisional anti-dumping duty will lapse at the end of the period for which it 
was imposed unless "that" duty is before the end of that period definitively 
imposed on those goods in the Customs Tariff. This is significant in two 
respects: firstly, this sub- section implies that the provisional anti-dumping 
duty and the definitive anti-dumping duty are the same species and 
secondly, the sub-section makes it clear that the definitive anti-dumping 
duty is not a new duty but in fact, "that provisional duty" which is already in 
application, which then becomes definitively imposed. Thus, there is a 
nexus between the provisional anti-dumping duty and the definitive anti-
dumping duties. This means that the time period imposed for the 
provisional anti-dumping duty should be considered in the determination of 
the total duration of the anti-dumping duty. That explains why in section 
15(6) of the CDA the statute provides for off-setting if a person made a 
payment of the provisional duty at a rate which exceeds the rate of the 
duty definitively imposed. 
Consequently, the CDA endorses the decision in POM as the correct 
precedent on this issue. Thus, it can be argued that in future the period of 
an anti-dumping duty should be calculated as encompassing the period 
during which the provisional anti-dumping duty is in operation. This 
common sense approach of the CDA is in accordance with the ADA and 
section 233 of the Constitution. 
3.3 Back tracking of the SCA 
3.3.1 The central legal issue in Progress Office Machines 
The court in AMIE explains Progress Office Machine's decision and 
outlines the implications of that judgment. This was done in an attempt to 
set the record straight, as it were. The court held that POM had little 
bearing on the matter other than to explain its genesis.71 The rationale of 
the court in AMIE is that POM decided on the meaning of the word 
"imposition" on the basis of Article 11.3 of the ADA because that is what 
                                            
71  AMIE para 61. 
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the litigants agreed to do.72 According to the AMIE judgment, that 
interpretation of "imposition" is relevant only when the meaning of 
"imposition" within Regulation 53 is uncertain.73 Only then would POM be 
relevant to the AMIE case, and this is because of section 233 of the 
Constitution, which requires that the courts prefer a reasonable 
interpretation of legislation that is consistent with the one given to it in the 
ADA.74 The court then holds that since the validity of the Regulations is not 
in question, POM is thus not relevant to AMIE.75 
This view is incorrect: in POM, the central legal issue in the words of that 
court was the determination of the commencement date of the five-year 
period according to South African legislation.76 This was held to be so 
because the ADA has not been enacted into SA law, and thus no rights 
could be derived from it.77 The court made it clear that despite the fact that 
South Africa passed the ITAA and the Regulations, these are indicative 
only of an intention to give effect to international treaties such as ADA. 
The text that had to be interpreted remained South African legislation and 
its construction must be in conformity with section 233 of the 
Constitution.78 Thus Article 11.3 became relevant through section 233 of 
the Constitution, which requires that when interpreting the Constitution, 
every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of legislation that 
conforms to international law over any alternative that is inconsistent with 
international law.  
It is contended that this is essentially the same issue that was before the 
SCA in the AMIE case. According to the language of that court in AMIE, 
the question before the court was whether the period of five years 
commenced on the date of the notice or on the date on which the 
amendment was to have retrospective effect.79 In fact, the SCA held that 
the appeal in AMIE was to overcome the effect of the decision in POM.80 
The only difference is that POM chose to abide by the courts' 
constitutional obligations in section 233 whereas the same court in AMIE 
flouted its constitutional obligations and decided that the principle of 
construction, that legislation must be construed in favour of consistency 
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and against inconsistency if the language allows it, trumps its 
constitutional obligations.81 
The issue of adherence to section 233 of the Constitution in both cases 
ought to be read in the light of the debate on transformative justice in 
South Africa. Former Chief Justice Pius Langa is of the opinion that the 
role of the courts in a transformative legal order such as South Africa is to 
justify their decisions with reference to ideas and values enshrined in the 
Constitution.82 This is one of the issues upon which POM and AMIE 
digress. This is because in the latter decision of AMIE, the SCA deviates 
from its role in a transformative legal order by deciding that a rule of 
interpretation based in common law trumps a value explicitly enshrined in 
the Constitution. 
However, Langa submits that although it is true that the law and politics 
are not the same, they are intertwined, and this means that the notion of 
the neutral judge must be rejected, as beliefs, opinions and ideas play a 
role in judicial decisions.83 This implies that judges sometimes will make 
decisions that accord with the politics of the time and that lend themselves 
to reasons of efficacy and expediency. That is to say, it would cause a 
financial debacle and a regulatory nightmare if the decision in POM were 
allowed to endure, as it essentially invalidated the SA anti-dumping 
regulatory framework in toto and meant that injurious dumping could occur 
without any remedy. Thus, the decision in AMIE may have been driven 
more by reasons of logic and efficacy rather than by pure law, as it were. 
The court in AMIE conceded as much when it held that the authorities 
feared that based on the rationale of Progress Office Machines, other 
duties pertaining at the time may have lapsed, and to overcome the 
difficulties that would arise the authorities commenced proceedings in the 
North Gauteng High Court.84This rationale accords with the legal 
philosophy of American Realism, which propagates the notion that judicial 
decisions are purely a reflection of the interplay between the law and a 
judge's backgrounds and personal beliefs.  
3.3.2 Deference to the litigants 
Another factor worth mentioning is the perplexing approach of the SCA to 
the litigants in both judgments. The SCA defers to the interpretation of the 
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law proffered by the parties before the court, rather than the correct one. 
According to the SCA, both cases were presented by "agreement or 
concession" by the parties that the duration of the anti-dumping duty 
imposed by the Minister of Finance is a period of five years.85 This of 
course ignores the fact that the court in Progress Office Machines 
expressly held that the concessions by the litigants on duration were 
properly made.86 This assertion is ambiguous to say the least, but it 
implies that the court agrees with the litigants' legal submissions in that 
regard.  
Furthermore, the court in AMIE goes so far as to say that the court in POM 
decided only the narrow question of what was meant by "imposition" in 
Article 11.3 and made the Order on that basis because that was what the 
parties agreed it should do.87 A court should not merely defer to the 
interpretation and shared views of the litigants before it, but must seek to 
find the correct legal position. It is the court's duty to interpret the law 
correctly and not to pander to the whims of the litigants. This subservient 
attitude of the SCA renders it a pawn for use by the colluding litigants and 
would leave interested parties uncertain as to the law on dumping in South 
Africa.  
Pertinently, the bold and clear approach of the Constitutional Court in the 
SCAW case is correct in that the court did not merely defer to the litigants: 
it emphatically held that the Regulations echo the ADA when they provide 
that the dumping duties must expire after the five-year period has lapsed, 
unless a sunset review or a judicial review has been initiated prior to the 
said date of expiry.88 Thus, the flirtatious and yet non-committal approach 
of the SCA in POM and AMIE propagates the dreaded "indefinite inelastic 
term of duties" and promotes routine breaches of international 
obligations.89  
3.3.3 The Regulations 
 In AMIE it was held that Progress Office Machines "decided nothing at all 
concerning the effects of the regulations".90 Contrary to this conclusion, 
the same court in Progress Office Machines emphatically held that 
Regulation 53, the gravamen of both cases, provides that anti-dumping 
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duties should not endure beyond the period of five years from the 
imposition or the date of the last review.91 In fact, Progress Office 
Machines held that the imposition of the duties beyond the five-year period 
demarcated in the ADA would be a breach of South Africa's international 
obligations and an unreasonable interpretation of the notice, and to that 
extent invalid.92 Thus, the SCA in the case of AMIE essentially attempts to 
rewrite its findings in the earlier judgment of Progress Office Machines.  
Malan AJA, writing for the majority in Progress Office Machines, held that 
the court a quo was undoubtedly correct in finding that the anti-dumping 
duty may be imposed in certain circumstances for a period longer than five 
years. That is, where a sunset review has been initiated under Regulation 
53.2 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations, the anti -dumping duty remains in 
force until the review has been finalised.93 In this regard Malan AJA 
implies that exceeding the five-year period is an exception rather than the 
norm. Consequently the court's dictum in AMIE that POM "decided nothing 
at all concerning the effects of the regulations" is incorrect.94 In fact, the 
decision in POM made more than a mere "passing reference" to the 
Regulations.95 
3.3.4 Ratification or not: The flirtatious and yet non-committal approach of 
the SCA  
In international law, ratification is the process by which a state deposits a 
document with a treaty depository signifying the state's definitive 
acceptance to be bound by the treaty which it has previously signed.96 The 
domestic process of "ratification" differs from state to state but typically 
involves some approval by a duly authorised legislative body, which gives 
the executive the right to ratify the treaty. Alternatively, it may bring the 
treaty provisions into municipal law to avoid conflict with the treaty 
obligations.97 In South Africa, the nature of the treaty determines whether 
it needs parliamentary approval or merely tabling.98  
According to section 231 of the Constitution, an international agreement 
becomes law in SA only if it has been approved by resolution in the 
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National Assembly and by the National Council of Provinces and when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation, unless it is an international 
agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, in which case 
it would not need approval by Parliament but must be tabled in the 
Assembly and Council within a reasonable time.99 Dugard believes that 
this approach of legislative enactment abandons the idealism of the 
Interim Constitution of 1993 and brings South African law into line with 
international law.100 Bearing this in mind, one can classify the ADA either 
as a "technical" treaty as per section 231(3) of the Constitution or an 
international agreement that requires approval by Parliament and 
legislative enactment as per section 231(2) and section 231(4) of the 
Constitution. Recent precedents on the ADA at the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court appear to gravitate towards the latter 
form, which requires parliamentary approval and legislative enactment.101 
This approach should not detract from the contention that the ADA could 
be classified as a "technical" treaty as envisaged by section 231(3). This 
would negate the whole debate on ratification of the ADA and avoid the 
confusing judgments of the highest courts in South Africa on whether or 
not the ADA constitutes binding law in South Africa.  
A study of recent precedents on the ADA in South African law is littered 
with ambiguity and confusion. The courts have vacillated between 
commitment and evasiveness on the relationship between the ADA and 
domestic law. The SCA, in Progress Office Machines, had held that the 
ITAA and the Anti-Dumping Regulations were "indicative" of an intention to 
give effect to the provisions of the treaties binding in the Republic in 
international law.102 It is not clear whether this equates to the enactment of 
the ADA into law by national legislation as per section 231 of the 
Constitution. It is contended that in practice, international treaties are 
approved and ratified but not incorporated into domestic law unless 
domestic implementation is essential for compliance with South Africa's 
international obligations.103 This current custom means that South Africa 
often becomes party to major treaties without incorporating them into 
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domestic law.104 This common sense approach would accord with the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court in SCAW. 
However, this assertion is in conflict with the Constitutional Court decision 
in Glenister v the President of the Republic (hereafter Glenister), where it 
was held that the actions of the executive in negotiating and signing an 
international agreement do not result in a binding agreement.105 The court 
also held that legislative action is required before an international 
agreement can bind the Republic.106 Glenister held further that one of the 
methods of ratification is that the provisions of the agreement are 
embodied in the text of an Act.107 It is submitted that the CEA; the ITAA 
and the Regulations represent the "embodiment" of the provisions of the 
ADA on anti-dumping as contemplated in Glenister. Of course, it is not 
immediately clear what the term "embodiment" means. It could mean the 
comprehensive transplanting of a treaty into domestic law or the 
assimilation of the material terms of the international agreement, such as 
the ADA, into domestic law. The court in SCAW appeared to gravitate 
towards the latter form when it readily accepted that the ITAA, the Board 
on Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 1986 and the Regulations were enacted to 
honour the ADA.108  
In the same vein, the SCA in POM ironically held that the continuation of 
the anti-dumping duties in question would be a violation of the ADA and an 
unreasonable interpretation of the notice in casu.109 It further held that 
Article 11 of the ADA "obliges" South Africa to create a regime for the 
termination of anti-dumping duties and South Africa has "chosen" to do so 
via Regulations 38.1 and Regulation 53.110  
However, the same court in AMIE held that the meaning attached to 
Article 11.3 of the ADA in its previous decision of Progress Office 
Machines is authoritative only when the Article is applied domestically but 
is immaterial in so far as this country's relations with its partners are 
concerned.111 In the same vein, yet paradoxically, the SCA in AMIE 
endorsed the decision in Progress Office Machines that the ADA does not 
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apply directly in South African law.112 It is a perplexing feature of both 
judgments that the court appears to flirt with the ADA whenever 
convenient but never makes a commitment to it. This is even more 
astounding considering that the Constitutional Court's decision in SCAW 
was delivered in between the hearing of these two cases, and explicitly 
clarifies and establishes that the duration of a dumping duty in SA is 
regulated by Article 11.3 of the ADA.113  
The uncertainty created by AMIE reflects the general confusion in SA law 
evident in the decision in Glenister.114 In Glenister the Constitutional Court 
was unable to definitively determine whether the Corruption Convention 
was approved by resolution of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces as required by section 231(2) of the Constitution.115 
This is disappointing, to the say the least.  
However, in SCAW the Constitutional Court explicitly held that South 
Africa's international obligations on tariffs and dumping arise from the 
ADA.116 As earlier stated, the Constitutional Court held that South Africa 
honours these obligations through the CEA, the Anti-Dumping 
Regulations, the ITAA and, where appropriate, the Board of Tariffs and 
Trade Act.117 Thus, SCAW endorsed the approach and the decision of 
Progress Office Machines with regards to the ratification of ADA in SA law 
in most respects.118 It was held in SCAW that a contrary approach would 
render the ADA nugatory and would impede the enforcement of the 
provisions of the ADA to the detriment of the member states, exporters 
and consumers.119 In AMIE, Wallis JA in a separate judgment also 
endorses SCAW''s finding that South Africa's obligations under the ADA 
are binding.120 SCAW, in its bold approach towards ratification, represents 
a step forward in advancing the common sense approach that the courts 
should not allow themselves to be constrained by the utopian rigours of 
black letter law, and endorses Dugard and Sucker's contention that current 
custom dictates that not all treaties have to be enacted into domestic law 
to become binding. 
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In any event, the Constitutional Court has held that international 
agreements that are not binding in our law may be used as interpretive 
tools.121 Thus, the AMIE decision on the question of the direct application 
of the ADA in South African law appears to contradict the Constitutional 
Court's finding in SCAW and thus represents a flagrant disregard of the 
doctrine of stare decisis which binds the South African courts to follow the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court as the highest court in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the AMIE decision that POM did not endorse Article 11.3122 
is disconcerting. Firstly, there is no cogent reason for a court to permit 
litigants to proceed on legal grounds emanating from legislation that it 
deems inapplicable to South African law. Secondly, if Article 11.3 of the 
ADA creates no rights as held in POM,123 one is perplexed by Malan AJA's 
conclusion in the same case that section 59 of ITAA seeks to give effect to 
the ADA.124 
Moreover, the ITAA provides that the object of the CEA is to create the 
ITAC, whose principal duty is to carry out the functions that arise out of an 
obligation of the Republic in terms of a trade agreement, if the Minister has 
assigned that function to the Commission.125 This represents a clear and 
emphatic intention to honour trade agreements like the ADA and to ratify 
the ADA, as seen by the various provisions in the CEA and Regulations 
that are borrowed from the WTO Agreements. The court in Progress 
Office Machines concurred with this conclusion.126 Furthermore, in 
Chairman: Board On Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Incorporated it was held 
that the Board of Tariffs and Trade had been guided by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement in drafting the dumping legislation.127  
Thus, the SCA's and the Constitutional Court's flirtatious and yet non-
committal approach to the ADA creates an environment of uncertainty. 
South Africa is yet to promulgate legislation that explicitly reflects 
ratification of ADA, but the CEA, the ITAA and the Regulations reflect an 
implicit attempt at ratification. A slavish adherence to the orthodox method 
of ratifying an international treaty would be superficial and would place an 
unfair financial burden on countries seeking to export goods to SA. This 
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approach is endorsed by Dugard, who submits that ratification depends on 
intention.128 Dugard submits that when parties intend that a treaty is to 
come into force immediately, it would be ridiculous for South African courts 
to insist on parliamentary ratification.129 In any event, the anti-dumping 
duties are imposed against products from other countries and not 
domestic products. The effect of the court decisions is international 
because the effects of the duty are directly felt by companies exporting 
goods to South Africa, as held by the Constitutional Court in the SCAW 
case.130 
In addition, the ADA expressly provides for judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the 
prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations in 
duties.131 This enables the national judicial review of anti-dumping duties 
imposed against products from other WTO member countries. Therefore, 
there is no doubt that the decisions passed by national courts on a WTO 
issue have an international application and are recognised by the WTO. 
Moreover, the ADA expressly confers upon ITAC, upon its own initiative or 
that of affected parties, the right to review the anti-dumping duties which 
affect products from other countries.132 Member countries are granted the 
right to decide either continue with the duties or to terminate.133 This 
power is conferred on national bodies and not international bodies. These 
decisions have effects beyond national borders. In the same vein, the 
DSU specifically confers upon any nation that has legislation on anti-
dumping to allow judicial review in terms of Article 13 of anti-dumping 
duties.  
In fact, endorsement of the continued imposition of duties on chicken 
portions in AMIE has led to a protracted legal dispute between South 
Africa and the United States of America, which has culminated in the latter 
threatening to retaliate against South Africa through the removal of 
preferences granted to South Africa under the Africa Growth Opportunity 
Act (AGOA).This threat of retaliation clearly shows that the absurd 
conclusion in AMIE that the SCA's decisions on dumping are not material 
to South Africa's relations with other countries is unsound and devoid of 
merit. 
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4 Conclusion 
It appears that international trade law disputes will continue to be decided 
according to the law as interpreted by the litigants and not the courts. This 
is because the courts have proven malleable to the claims of the litigants 
on disputes pertaining to dumping and have permitted them to proceed on 
grounds which may or may not have legal merit. 
Secondly, there is considerable uncertainty on whether the ADA is binding 
in South African law or not. The courts in South Africa seem ill equipped to 
deal with international trade law disputes. This may be an unintended 
consequence of the general malaise of African countries in WTO disputes 
and their insipid reluctance to engage other nations in trade disputes due 
to shortages in skill and financial resources. This unfortunate economic 
consequence and the paucity of African precedents in the WTO dispute 
resolution process may have seeped into the South African courts and led 
to general uncertainty on dumping law. 
Despite valiant attempts by the SCA and the Constitutional Court to 
develop cogent legal solutions to the question of the correct methodology 
to use in order to determine the date of the commencement of definitive 
anti-dumping duties, particularly when provisional measures are 
concerned, the courts have failed to create legal certainty in this area. The 
ambivalence of the highest courts in South Africa has morphed into a 
flirtatious and non-committal approach to issues relating to dumping law. 
This has happened despite the Constitutional Court's attempts to bring 
clarity to the issue.  
The newly minted CDA, with its deliberately selected simpler terminology 
and precise provisions derived from international law on the method of 
determining the date of imposition of anti-dumping duties, particularly 
where provisional duties are involved, may bring clarity and cogency to the 
South African situation and also align South African law on dumping with 
WTO law.  
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